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Behavioral Paternalism 
Or the Possibility of Paternalism 
Christophe Salvat1 
CNRS, Triangle, ENS de Lyon 
 
Abstract: 
In this article I address the question of the moral legitimacy of paternalism. Paternalism is considered 
illegitimate a) when it acts under false pretenses to satisfy the interest of the paternalist agent, b) when 
it violates the individual autonomy of the people interfered with and c) when it does not respect the 
equality between people by singling out those who are deemed unable to decide for themselves. Over 
the last decade a new type of paternalism has emerged thanks to the groundbreaking works of some 
behavioral economists. This new type of paternalism, that I call here Behavioral Paternalism (BP), has 
become popular through Sunstein and Thaler’s Nudges theory and challenges the view that 
paternalism is unacceptable today. The aim of this paper is to assess its moral legitimacy (not 
exclusively focusing on the autonomy proviso). The results of my investigation can be summarized as 
follows. Though BP is usually acknowledged for its ‘libertarian’ character, it does not satisfy the 
conditions of what is considered, since Feinberg, as ‘soft paternalism’. Nevertheless, BP has a strong 
point that has been underestimated by its partisans: it withstands the equality argument. Unlike 
traditional forms of paternalism, BP is not demeaning and does not ostracize any category of people. 
                                                     
1
 Early versions of this paper have been presented at the Collège International de Philosophie in Paris (January 
2010), at the University of Lille (Institut d’Economie Politique, June 2012), at the University of Strasbourg 
(BETA Seminar, November 2012) and at the University of Cambridge (Faculty of Philosophy, January 2013). I 
am grateful to all participants for their insightful remarks. I would also like to thank the referees of Revue de 
Philosophie Economique for their helpful comments. Whilst this paper was under review some interesting works 
have been published on paternalism. I wish to mention in particular Paternalism: Theory and Practice, edited by 
Christian Coons and Michael Weber (Cambridge University Press, 2013) , as I would certainly have made 
extensive use of it.  
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Lastly, BP can be proved genuinely altruistic. This, however, demands that one abandons Sunstein and 
Thaler’s main assumptions.  
Key words: paternalism, behiavorism, equality, autonomy 
 
1. Introduction 
The idea of paternalism has suffered dramatically since the decline of the nineteenth-century model of 
entrepreneurial capitalism.  As a social practice, it is widely considered as a patronizing and morally 
inappropriate conduct to adopt for any individuals benefiting from a superior economic, social or 
political position. The philosophical debate over the legitimacy of paternalism, however, twice 
endeavored to challenge this view. A first wave of arguments in favor of paternalism dates from the 
1970s2, a second only started a few years ago under the influence of major behaviorist thinkers. It 
emerges from all these contributions that modern paternalism no longer bears resemblance to social or 
religious charity. In the 1970s paternalism was essentially considered from a legal point of view 
(Feinberg, 1983, Feinberg, 1986, Dworkin, 1971) or, if not, from a medical point of view (Buchanan, 
1978, Gert and Culver, 1976, Dworkin, 1983). The questioning, however, remains the same: under 
what conditions can paternalism be morally acceptable?  
In the nineteenth-century entrepreneurial or social paternalism was often perceived as serving the 
interests of the dominant class under false pretenses. Paternalism was thought immoral because it was 
not genuinely altruistic. Since WWII legal paternalism has been criticized for being intrusive and 
coercive. Paternalism was then thought immoral because it was perceived as a threat to individual 
freedom. A few years later paternalism suffered another philosophical blow when it emerged that it 
was also violating individuals’ basic right to equality (Dworkin, 1978, Anderson, 1999, Arneson, 
2005). As one can see, the moral demands made to paternalism have shifted over time and conformed 
to new ideologies. But none disappeared altogether. It is still considered immoral for paternalism to be 
                                                     
2
 Most of the original contributions as well as a number of unpublished ones (including Dworkin’s Second 
Thoughts) have been gathered in the volume edited by Rolf Sartorius in 1983, SARTORIUS, R.E. (1983), 
Paternalism. University of Minnesota Press. 
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self-interested, and ensuring that individuals ‘paternalized’ are treated with equal respect does not 
encroach upon their basic right to freedom. Theories defending paternalism have to therefore adjust to 
continually meet more demanding moral standards.  
At the beginning of the new millennium, spurred on by the success of behavioral studies, new theories 
on paternalism took up the challenge (Jolls et al., 1998, Sunstein and Thaler, 2003, Thaler and 
Sunstein, 2008, Camerer et al., 2003, Loewenstein and Haisley, 2008). Sometimes called ‘libertarian’, 
‘asymetric’, ‘light’ or simply ‘new’ paternalism, these theories are all related to behavioral sciences. 
For simplicity’s sake, I shall refer to them as Behavioral Paternalism (BP).  
The aim of this paper is to assess BP’s ‘moral robustness’ and to check to what extent the three moral 
provisos have been taken into account. This paper is divided into five sections. In the first section I 
present what I consider to be the three main moral requirements that paternalism has to meet today, i.e. 
individual freedom, respect of equality and genuine moral intentions. The second part explains what I 
call Behavioral Paternalism. The following three sections respectively deal with the three moral 
requirements presented in the first section.   
 
2. Can paternalism be moral ? 
The first and most intuitive argument opposed to paternalism is the respect of individual freedom. 
Opponents of paternalism defend a right to autonomy or self-direction (VanDeVeer, 1986). It is 
naturally not an absolute right. The nature of governments is to interfere with an individual’s decision-
making process. Liberals believe that it is legitimate to do so only when individual actions are other-
regarding. They hence justify legal restrictions such as the obligation for an individual to wear a 
helmet or a seatbelt whilst driving a car or a motorbike by the benefit reaped by others (the cost born 
by the collectivity) rather than by the utility the individual should expect from the measure. This 
means that to comply with this critic, self-regarding justifications for paternalism must always be 
proved inadequate to back interventions or they must be able to be otherwise justified. In practice, 
however, it is rather difficult to ascertain that no self-regarding justification for paternalism can ever 
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be found or that other-regarding justifications will be sufficient (Marneffe, 2006).  The question is 
therefore not whether paternalism is a legitimate practice but to what extent autonomy provides a 
justification (or not) for paternalism.    
For Joel Feinberg (Feinberg, 1986), the violation of individual autonomy is the sole possible 
justification for anti-paternalism. Conversely autonomy can also be its sole possible justification. In a 
certain number of cases paternalistic interventions can thus be justified by the absence or insufficiency 
of individual autonomy. Four factors contribute, for Feinberg, to weaken the autonomous or voluntary 
quality of individual decisions. Those are: 
 
1. Coercion or threat of coercion  
2. Psychological dependency (drug, alcohol, hypnosis…) 
3. Emotional ascendency (depression, anger, obsession…) 
4a. Misinformation, deceit or wrong belief that misleads the agent relative to the consequences of his 
action (I.e. accidentally taking arsenic for salt) 
4b. Misinformation or a wrong belief (produced by the individual inability to gather correct 
information) that eventually misleads him relative to the consequences of his action. 
To remedy the totalitarian tendency of paternalism, Joel Feinberg proposes to vet its practice on the 
condition that it respects individual freedom. This ‘soft’ or ‘weak’ version of paternalism originates 
from Mill’s own ambiguity in his famous harm principle: ‘That principle is, that the sole end for 
which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of 
any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. 
[…] He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, 
because it will make him happier, because in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or even 
right’ (Mill, 1989: 13). Due to the ambiguity of Mill’s phrasing (‘against his will’) – but also due to a 
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pervasive ambiguity throughout his work3– the discussion about the legitimacy of paternalism soon 
boiled down to a single argument: the degree of voluntariness in the action interfered with4. The 
notion of will can indeed either refer to a current (and temporary) desire or to a ‘true’ and rational will. 
From this information the nature (and hence the legitimacy) of paternalism could be inferred: a weak 
or soft paternalism meant to protect individuals against self-inflicting (but not fully voluntary) harm, 
while “in its extreme version”, a strong or hard paternalism was supposed “to guide them, whether 
they like it or not, toward their own good” (Feinberg 1983: 3). A criticism of Feinberg, however, is 
that he sets a sliding scale of Mill’s liberalism rather than properly offering a moral criterion of 
paternalism. 
The second criticism addressed to paternalism is that it violates the fundamental principle of equality. 
Many philosophers understandably condemn paternalism for its condescending and offensive practices 
(Shiffrin, 2000, Anderson, 1999, Kleinig, 1983, VanDeVeer, 1986). A number of liberal thinkers 
consider the right to equality second to none (Dworkin, 1978, Anderson, 1999, Rawls, 1971, Arneson, 
2000), but they often disagree on what constitutes an unfair inequality. Paternalism primarily 
originates from the desire to correct inequality of luck, that is to say inequalities that do not result from 
individual choices. There is little merit in becoming deputy director of a company when one is born in 
a rich and well-educated family in the nineteenth century, and when moreover the company belongs to 
one’s father. It is conversely extremely difficult to access such a position when one is born in a 
working class family or a poorhouse orphanage, for example. This is what is called (bad) brute luck. 
This is the reason why, historically, the wealthy and the well-educated often felt the need to share 
                                                     
3
 Commentators disagree on Mill’s positions towards paternalism. Richard Arneson, for instance, has argued that 
Mill’s political philosophy is not compatible with soft anti-paternalist positions ARNESON, R. (1980), 'Mill 
versus Paternalism', Ethics, 90, 470-89. 
4
 Voluntariness is, for Feinberg, essentially based on responsibility. The five above circumstances obliterate the 
decision maker’s responsibility since the choices made do not express the individual character. Conversely, 
individuals take full responsibility for autonomous or voluntary choices  “since they represent him faithfully, 
expressing his settled values and preferences” (Feinberg, 1989: 113). For Feinberg, misinformation always 
constitutes an autonomy-diminishing factor. Richard Arneson argues, however, that “a person’s actions may be 
authentic expressions of his personality without being deliberately chosen”  (Arneson, 1980: 487). 4b is thus 
only acceptable if the behavior responsible for the misinformation is itself ‘out of character’, that is, which is 
submitted to one of the previous autonomy-diminishing factors. He concludes that voluntary choice is admittedly 
“important but [that it] does not plausibly have the make-or-break significance that soft paternalism attaches to 
it” and that it is therefore “a mistake to make a fetish of” it (Arneson, 2005). 
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what they believed to be undeserved luck with the working classes by providing them with free access 
to education. Although intuitively very appealing, luck egalitarianism has come under criticism for its 
demeaning attitude towards those who were deemed to be victims of bad luck. What Anderson 
reproaches about luck egalitarianism is that it categorizes the victims of bad luck according to what 
they are (stupid, untalented, disabled, ugly, socially awkward, etc…)5. No wonder that she finds its 
response, paternalism, offensive. Unsolicited, paternalist actions have disastrous effects on the ill-
endowed people they are supposed to help. By granting people a (financial) compensation for their 
condition, they actually treat them as incomplete human beings. In its most traditional form (derived 
from the father-child analogy), paternalism is also often justified by the economic, cognitive or social 
superiority of the paternalist agent6.  
The third criticism addressed to paternalism is that under the false pretension of being altruistic, it 
actually only serves the interest of the paternalistic agent. Paternalism is said to be immoral because it 
is falsely moral and that it uses immoral means to conceal its real nature. The captains of industry of 
the nineteenth-century who built social houses, school and hospitals for their workers have often been 
accused of being more interested in the productivity and the low turnover of their company than by the 
actual well-being of their low paid and hard working employees. Besides, it is not difficult to imagine 
cases where ‘good natured people’ resort to ‘wrong means’ in order to complete what they consider as 
being ‘a good action’7. There is undoubtedly some truth in this. There is no point in denying it. 
                                                     
5
 Elizabeth Anderson argues that the point of equality was neither resources nor luck but status. And treating a 
category of people as children or adults as “too stupid to run their lives” (Anderson, 1999: 301) is incompatible 
with the respect all individuals should equally be granted. “Egalitarianism”, she writes, “ought to reflect a 
generous, humane, cosmopolitan vision of a society that recognizes individuals as equals in all their diversity. It 
should promote institutional arrangements that enable the diversity of people’s talents, aspirations, roles, and 
cultures to benefit everyone and to be recognized as mutually beneficial. Instead, the hybrid of capitalism and 
socialism envisioned by luck egalitarians reflects the mean-spirited, contemptuous, parochial vision of a society 
that represents human diversity hierarchically, moralistically contrasting the responsible and irresponsible, the 
innately superior and the innately inferior, the independent and the dependent. It offers no aid to those it labels 
irresponsible, and humiliating aid to those it labels innately inferior.” (Anderson, 1999: 308). 
6
 For Gert and Culver, for instance, “paternalism can be practiced by anyone who has qualifications which he 
believes enable him to see better than S what is good for S’s good” (Gert and Culver, 1976: 50). 
7 Allen Buchanan, for instance, has condemned a number of disgraceful medical practices involving withholding 
information or even bluntly lying to patients about their state of health to ‘avoid them any unnecessary harm’ 
(Buchanan, 1978). Bernard Gert and Charles Culver, studying the moral practices of medicine (a field known 
today as bioethics), also condemn the shams of medical paternalism (Gert and Culver, 1979, Gert et al., 2006). 
They contend in particular that “an essential feature of paternalistic behavior toward a person is the violation of 
moral rules (or doing that which will require such violations), for example, the moral rules prohibiting deception, 
deprivation of freedom or opportunity, or disabling” (Gert and Culver, 1976: 48). Most of the criticisms 
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Paternalism has indeed suffered from a long history of abusive practices. But what has been done in its 
name should not stop us looking for its real nature. I feel frustrated when I see a definition that 
automatically endorses the popular view that paternalism is a deceitful practice8.  In that respect, I 
believe that paternalism does not significantly differ from altruism: a large number of so-called 
altruistic actions are in fact self-interested but it does not imply that altruism, as a general practice, is 
wrong. So let us admit that moral actions do exist, and that paternalism can be genuinely altruistic. By 
altruistic I mean disinterested and benevolent. I do not contest the possibility that the agent might have 
some indirect and/or long-term interest in his benevolent action. After all, we all ultimately gain from 
altruism. I merely consider that his action is altruistic if it is not motivated by self-interest. To borrow 
Thomas Nagel’s phrase, it is “a willingness to act in consideration of the interests of other persons, 
without the need of ulterior motives” (Nagel, 1970: 79). Moral paternalism relies on the possibility of 
altruism.  
 
3. Behavioral Paternalism 
In this section I present a new approach to paternalism that is referred to sometimes as ‘New 
Paternalism’ (Rizzo, 2009, Mead, 1997, Economist, 2006, Holt, 2006), ‘Asymmetric Paternalism’ 
(Camerer et al., 2003, Loewenstein et al., 2007), ‘Light’ (Loewenstein and Haisley, 2008) or 
‘Libertarian Paternalism’ (Sunstein and Thaler, 2003, Thaler and Sunstein, 2003, Thaler and Sunstein, 
2008). Despite this variety of designations I nevertheless prefer to call it ‘Behavioral Paternalism’ 
(hereafter BP). My justification for this is that, apart from ‘New Paternalism’ (but new is not a 
definitive characteristic), all these expressions prejudge the legitimacy of this new type of paternalism. 
Since my aim is precisely to discuss the terms of its legitimacy, I therefore believe that a neutral but 
                                                                                                                                                                     
addressed to medical paternalism can nevertheless be handled through the principle of equality put forward by 
Elizabeth Anderson. What is, I believe, truly shocking in these practices is not the fact that doctors lie to their 
patients but the fact that they consider them incapable to cope with their own death.   
 
8
 For Allen Buchanan, for instance, “[P]aternalism is usually characterized as interference with a person’s liberty 
of action, where the alleged justification of the interference is that it is for the good of the person whose liberty 
of action is thus restricted.”[I underline] BUCHANAN, A.E. (1978), 'Medical Paternalism', Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, 7, 371-90. 
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informative qualifying adjective is more appropriate. The term ‘behavioral’ imposes itself since the 
revival of paternalism observed for the last decade originates from behavioral sciences.   
The American lawyer Cass Sunstein and economist Richard Thaler are the first and most important 
champions of BP (Jolls et al., 1998, Sunstein and Thaler, 2003, Thaler and Sunstein, 2003, Thaler and 
Sunstein, 2008, Jolls and Sunstein, 2006). Their groundbreaking works on libertarian paternalism have 
produced a vast academic literature and found a favorable echo with politicians. Their work, directly 
inspired by Richard Thaler’s own contributions to behavioral economics, has the merit of raising anew 
the question of the possibility and the legitimacy of paternalism in the 21st century. The paternalism 
they defend radically differs from the traditional philosophical approaches inherited from Mill’s ‘soft 
anti-paternalism’ (Feinberg, 1986: 15). They contest, in particular, the idea that paternalism is 
necessarily coercive and that it is predominantly institutionally-based.  
Behavioral studies gave partisans of paternalism two major arguments. Firstly empirical studies have 
repeatedly shown that individual actions do not meet the rationality standard that the economic theory 
would expect. The idea of bounded rationality, introduced by Herbert Simon (Simon, 1957), has been 
decisive in explaining what was otherwise considered as economically inconsistent (Elster, 1985, 
Simon, 1982, Rubinstein, 1998, Kahneman, 2003). Ted O’Donoghue and Matthew Rabin hence show 
that their model of sin taxes acknowledging individuals’ bounded rationality has huge consequences in 
terms of economic policy: “Economic policy prescriptions might change once we recognize that 
humans are humanly rational rather than superhumanly rational, and in particular it may be fruitful for 
economists to study the possible advantages of paternalistic policies that help people make better 
choices.[…] In other words, economists ought to treat the analysis of optimal paternalism as a 
mechanism-design problem when some agents might be boundedly rational.” (O'Donoghue and Rabin, 
2003). For some years now, economic models of bounded rationality have been supplemented by new 
evidence provided by neuroscientists, giving birth to a new discipline called neuroeconomics 
(Camerer et al., 2004, Camerer et al., 2005, Camerer, 2007, Kahneman, 2011). According to Colin 
Camerer neurosciences definitely undermine the ‘Revealed-Preference Approach’ by showing the role 
played by the difference between experienced utility (‘liking’) and decision-utility (‘wanting’) in 
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individual suboptimal choices. Benevolent agents (or governments), who are aware of the gap between 
the utility individuals think they will obtain (what they want) and the utility (or disutility) they will 
actually get (what they like), are then given the opportunity to act paternalistically without risks 
(Camerer, 2006, Camerer, 2008). In his terms “paternalism could be justified, in terms of a person’s 
own welfare, if the wanting system does not produce what the liking system likes and if the 
intervention creates more liking than the person would achieve on his own or with market-supplied 
help” (Camerer, 2006: 101-02).  
A second argument for paternalism is individuals’ endogenous preferences. Preferences are claimed 
by behaviorists to be endogenous to social contexts and consequently inconsistent from one situation 
to another, the lack of any past or similar reference introducing an element of arbitrariness in the 
evaluation9. Over the last twenty years, behavioral economics has offered a great deal of evidence to 
support this thesis (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 2006). Framing, anchor or endowment effects have been 
identified as some of the key mechanisms at stake (Thaler, 1980, Loewenstein and Adler, 1995, 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1986, Tversky and Kahneman, 1981, Kahneman et al., 1991). But if 
endogenous preferences are responsible for individuals’ poor rational behavior, they can also be the 
medium for their own remedy; the remedy is in the disease. For Sunstein and Thaler, for instance, it is 
possible to significantly reduce the lack of individual rationality by switching the default rule settings 
from an ‘opt in’ to an ‘opt out’ formula. They illustrate the benefits of setting change in default rules 
with two case studies: the case of 401 (k) employee savings plans (Madrian and Shea, 2001, Choi et 
al., 2002) and their own experience of the University of Chicago’s car park payment system.  
In the first case, employers decide that instead of letting their employees join a savings plan, the 
American 401 (k) plan, they would automatically enroll them unless employees specifically stated that 
they did not wish to be included. When eligible, employees usually receive a 401 (k) plan form that 
they must complete in order to join. In this case, however, employees only receive a statement in 
                                                     
9
 The idea of ‘coherent arbitrariness’ of preferences developed by Dan Ariely, George Loewenstein and Drazen 
Prelec shows, however, that valuations are not entirely arbitrary:  absolute valuation of goods or experience is 
for a large part arbitrary, but relative valuations can prove to be coherent ARIELY, D., LOEWENSTEIN, G. and 
PRELEC, D. (2003), '"Coherent Arbitrariness": Stable Demand Curves without Stable Preferences', The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118, 73-105. 
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which they are told that, unless they opt-out, they are automatically enrolled in the plan. In both 
studies, a significant increase in the enrollment rate was observed. In the second case, a change in the 
tax law made it possible for employees to pay for employer-provided parking on a pre-tax basis. The 
University of Chicago presumed that, although being in the employees’ interest, many of them would 
not take the trouble to fill in and send back the form and decided to enroll all employees automatically. 
Those who preferred to pay with after-tax dollars were, however, free to opt out10. Had the university 
chosen a different default rule (like an ‘opt in’ strategy), the authors reckon that “many employees, 
especially faculty members (and probably including the present authors), would still have that form 
buried somewhere in their offices and would be paying substantially more for parking on an after-tax 
basis” (Sunstein and Thaler, 2003: 1171). A minor effort, such as filling in a form, is often sufficient 
not to claim a benefit people are entitled to.  
Consider now their example of the cafeteria. The director is aware that the way she arranges the line of 
dishes will ‘frame’ the customers’ choice. According to the authors, she faces four alternatives11 
(Sunstein and Thaler, 2003: 1164):  
1. She could make choices that she thinks would be best for the customers, all things considered. 
2. She could make choices at random. 
3. She could choose those items that she thinks would make the customers as obese as possible. 
                                                     
10
 In practice, however, default rules are sticky and guaranteeing the conditions of free choice is difficult. Once a 
person has been enrolled in a default rule, he or she tends to overestimate its benefits (endowment effect). If 
opting in is a deterrent for many people, opting out from a default rule is even more dissuasive. To respect 
freedom of choice, a libertarian planner must set up a default rule that will be easy and costless for individuals to 
opt out of. Ideally, it should not be more demanding than a ‘one-click’ procedure (Sunstein & Thaler 2008: 249). 
11
 Robert Sugden pointed out that one option is surprisingly missing from the list: the cafeteria director might 
simply choose to display the dishes in the most economically efficient way SUGDEN, R. (2008), 'Why 
incoherent preferences do not justify paternalism', Constitutional Political Economy, 19, 226-48. The authors’ 
reasons for not including it are twofold. Firstly they argue that planners are not necessarily looking for profit 
maximization. Even directors of private companies, like school cafeterias, are not constantly subject to market 
pressures. Sunstein and Thaler do not distinguish profit driven from non-profit driven planners. Secondly, they 
claim that “market success will come not from tracking people’s ex ante preferences, but from providing goods 
and services that turn out, in practice, to promote their welfare, all things considered. Consumers might be 
surprised by what they end up liking; indeed, their preferences might change as a result of consumption.” 
SUNSTEIN, C.R. and THALER, R.H. (2003), 'Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron', The University of 
Chicago Law Review, 70, 1159-202. Although, technically speaking, one could argue that denying the existence 
of ex ante preferences does not logically imply that individual preferences are not being taken into account for 
profit making, it seems reasonable from the authors’ point of view to exclude the profit option from the 
manager’s choice. In the next section I present an amended version of the cafeteria example in which profit-
making cannot be a motivation.  
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4. She could give customers what she thinks they would choose on their own. 
 
Suppose for the moment that she chooses the first option (I shall discuss further her motivation to do 
so in the next section). She is well-aware that customers (much like herself) know what is healthy for 
them and what is not. But she is also aware (as her customers are as well) that the colors, the shapes, 
the odors and the disposition of goods arranged in front of them can influence their choice towards the 
unhealthiest dishes. Being director of the cafeteria and being in charge of the disposition of the line of 
dishes, she therefore has the opportunity to rearrange the dishes in order to reduce this behavioral bias.  
 
4. Morality of BP (I): autonomy 
To what extent is BP morally legitimate? In the first section I have suggested that – in order to be 
moral – paternalism ought to fulfill three criteria: respecting personal autonomy, respecting individual 
equality and being morally motivated. Let us consider these three criteria in connection with 
behavioral paternalism. The first condition is by far the one that has been given the most attention. 
Defendants of BP trust that its main asset is not to be coercive. This is the reason why they described it 
as ‘libertarian’, ‘soft’, ‘light’ or ‘asymmetric’. Sunstein and Thaler describe as their approach as “a 
relatively weak and nonintrusive type of paternalism” (Sunstein and Thaler 2003:1162). 
Soft or weak paternalism typically describes situations of involuntary acts or misinformed decisions 
that must be interfered with for the person’s own good. Typically, a soft paternalist can legitimately 
prevent a person from using the saltcellar if they have not been informed that it contains arsenic 
instead of salt. Similarly, a person under the influence of drugs or alcohol can be temporarily 
prevented from making decisions that he/she may bitterly regret the next day (Feinberg 1986). 
Alternatively, if a person is appropriately informed of the risks incurred from crossing a dangerous 
bridge, smoking, or duelling, then no external interference is ever justifiable to stop that person 
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carrying out such an action12. Soft paternalism re-establishes what some regard as an essential feature 
of liberalism: the right to act irrationally.  
Sunstein and Thaler’s libertarian paternalism is not a form of soft paternalism. It is, on the 
contrary,rooted in a very weak notion of voluntariness that makes it closer to hard paternalism. Their 
analysis, based on behavioral studies, shows that most individual choices are sub-optimal because 
their valuations depend on arbitrary anchors and frames. Their actions reflect the context in which they 
have been carried out rather than the proper preferences of the agents who welcome an external aid to 
help them make the right choice. To a certain degree, most of their actions are then involuntary: they 
want to be thin but eat fatty foods, they want to have a comfortable retirement but don’t save enough 
money, they want to donate their organs but don’t say so etc. Actions are not made involuntary 
because information is hidden but because individuals misuse it.  
The libertarian feature of their theory relies exclusively on freedom of choice. Yet there is an 
incongruity at simultaneously defending absolute freedom of choice and a weak concept of 
voluntariness. By discarding self-ownership, the authors actually undermined the possibility of 
libertarian paternalism. The number of opportunities a person gets is not relevant to assess their degree 
of freedom. Let me explain this by borrowing an example originally presented by Locke13. A prisoner 
is brought into a cell and is convinced that all the doors are locked when actually one has been left 
unlocked. Is this person free to get out? A libertarian like Nozick would answer in the affirmative. 
Technically, nobody physically stops him from getting out. He is not coerced into staying inside. A 
behaviourist, or for that matter a philosopher of autonomy like Dworkin, would argue, however, that 
since the prisoner is not aware of this opportunity, he is not any freer than if all the doors were actually 
locked. In the same way as in the cafeteria, where the order of the dishes is more significant to the 
consumers than their presence, the information given about the doors is more significant to the 
prisoner than their real state. If individuals were as rational as the economists suppose them to be (if 
they were ‘Econs’ to borrow Sunstein and Thaler’s terminology), they would not be subject to framing 
                                                     
12
 Other means are available such as debiasing cognitively or emotional wronged choices (Blumenthal, 2007, 
Mitchell, 2005, Jolls and Sunstein, 2006). 
13
 I borrow this example myself from Dworkin who used it to support his distinction between liberty and 
autonomy (Dworkin 1988:14). 
 13 
 
or anchor effects. They would correctly use the information they are given to maximise their welfare 
and all their actions would result from deliberate and well-informed decisions. Their actions would 
then be regarded as fully voluntary. 
Despite these criticisms, it would – I believe – be unfair not to acknowledge the progress realized by 
the partisans of BP in their attempts to minimize all forms of coercive interferences.  Despite its 
imperfections BP certainly has better chances (compared with other types of paternalism) to satisfy the 
autonomy proviso. But its main moral asset is not there. What BP does really change for paternalism is 
its relation to equality. 
5. Morality of BP (II): equality 
In the first section I showed how the equality proviso was challenging for the defense of paternalism. I 
believe, however, that behavioral paternalism can partly elude the criticisms mentioned earlier. 
Paternalism, as previously argued, is usually motivated by a willingness to correct an (unfair) 
inequality between people. It thus implicitly establishes a distinction between the ‘lucky’ and 
‘unlucky’ ones. Amongst the ‘unlucky’ ones, paternalism particularly favors those who have no 
personal responsibility in their misfortune (‘brute bad luck’): the ‘disabled’, the ‘ugly’, the ‘stupid’, 
and the ‘socially awkward’ ones (Anderson, 1999).  
But paternalism is only demeaning if it finds its justification in such categories. I believe, however, 
that this ought not to be the case, and that a morally legitimate paternalism is possible if it is grounded 
on positional asymmetries. This means, in particular, that a superior economic rationality (a higher 
ability to compute or to order preferences) does not qualify as a good reason to interfere with someone 
else’s life. In addition to being demeaning for those deemed to be intellectually ill-endowed, it has 
disastrous totalitarian consequences as it logically grants the most intelligent individuals the ability to 
overturn the decisions of the normally endowed ones ‘for their own sake’ (Wikler, 1979). By contrast, 
it is – I contend – morally acceptable for a person to act when her relative position gives her a 
cognitive advantage. Take Mill’s famous example of the threatening bridge (Mill, 1989). Consider that 
A only knows about the poor state of the bridge because he is a local, whereas B – who is about to 
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cross it – is foreign to the area. If B were local himself, he would not need A’s warning and would also 
probably warn foreigners against the danger of this bridge. A is in a relatively better position to make 
a decision on this matter than B. This situation does not, however, say anything about A being 
inherently superior to B.  
The same argument can apply to BP. It is possible to show that in the case of BP, paternalist agents 
cannot claim any superiority of body or mind. Take the cafeteria example: the director, or whoever 
arranges the dishes, is no different from her customers. In fact, she is a customer herself on her days 
off. The customers of the cafeteria are not victims of brute luck, waiting for her help. And she has no 
reason whatsoever to be kind to them (Sunstein and Thaler wrongly claim that she is necessarily 
benevolent, see next section). Nothing distinguishes her from the ‘paternalized customers’ except the 
position she occupies at the decision-making moment. If she does arrange the dishes so that her 
customers eat healthier, then her action undoubtedly qualifies as paternalistic. There is nothing 
demeaning about it: customers are not disgraced or marked out and the director is not motivated by a 
sense of justice. She arranges the dishes relatively to what she considers to be a ‘good’ order: meaning 
good for her and good for the others. BP does not require a cognitive or moral superiority from the 
paternalist agents. BP is what could be referred to as an ‘opportunistic paternalism’. If anything 
paternalism reflects individuals’ equality in front of behavioral bias. 
Sunstein and Thaler do not appreciate this point in their works. They prefer seeing paternalist agents 
as ‘planners’ or ‘choice architects’. The Paternalism Behaviorism I am presenting here is not a defense 
of Sunstein and Thaler’s ‘Nudges Theory’. It is, I insist, an acknowledgement of its theoretical 
potentialities, including those they have chosen not to pursue. The difference between libertarian 
paternalism and BP should become even clearer in the next section, in which I shall argue that to be 
morally acceptable BP should rely on what I can only call a moral inconsistency, a point that is 
irreconcilable with Sunstein and Thaler’s own theory. 
 
6. Morality of BP (III): altruism 
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In the previous paragraphs I have demonstrated 1) that although it does not perfectly conform to the 
autonomy proviso, BP does considerably better than any other form of paternalism (enough to be 
socially tolerable) and 2) that it is the only kind of paternalism that actually conforms to the equality 
proviso. The last point to be considered is the genuineness and the (un)avoidability of its altruism.  
In the first section I showed that paternalism is often dismissed as being falsely altruistic. Partisans of 
BP could argue, however, that this is not the case and that paternalist agents are genuinely morally 
motivated. What reason can agents possibly have to act altruistically?  
Most attempts to explain altruism in decision theory rest upon an empathetic conception of altruism 
(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, Gintis et al., 2008, Kolm and Ythier, 2006, Sen, 1991, Kirman A and Teschl 
M, 2010, Elster, 2009). An ‘altruistic’ agent is an agent whose well-being is functionally linked to 
other people’s well-being. She is therefore as interested as anyone else, the only difference being that 
her preferences are essentially other-regarding or ‘external’. Similarly, the philosophical notions of 
compassion and pity also involve the benevolent agent’s self-interest. Martha Nussbaum, who defends 
compassion as the foundation of ethics, defines it as “a painful emotion occasioned by the awareness 
of another person’s underserved misfortune” (Nussbaum, 2003: 301). Less instinctive and more 
positively orientated, sympathy plays a comparable role with compassion by connecting all 
individuals’ interest altogether (Fontaine, 1997, Sugden, 2002, Singer and Fehr, 2005). This is, 
however, not what I call altruism. Altruism, as I understand, it refers to purely disinterested actions. 
Besides, paternalistic actions motivated by compassion would undoubtedly violate the equality 
proviso described above. So far paternalism has then failed to prove its good intentions. Recent works 
in behavioral economics offer, however, new perspectives on the topic. Behavioral studies suggest 
indeed that people can behave out of interest and that their likeliness to do so largely depends on 
circumstances. In other words behavioral biases not only justify but also explain paternalistic actions.  
Consider the cafeteria example quoted above. Suppose now that the director of a cafeteria has to order 
fifteen dishes equally distributed between three classes of profitability level. She has to order all 
dishes, including the equally profitable ones. Since her interest as manager of the cafeteria is already 
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satisfied, she is otherwise indifferent to the way in which dishes are arranged within each profitability 
category. She could, for instance, adopt a random criterion of distribution. But moral options are also 
available to her: she could, as suggested by Sunstein and Thaler (Sunstein and Thaler, 2003, Thaler 
and Sunstein, 2008), promote healthy over fattening dishes, in which case she would act altruistically. 
Altruism – and consequently paternalism – is therefore theoretically possible.   
But how likely is it for the director of the cafeteria to choose the altruistic option? I believe that 
Sunstein and Thaler are wrong to consider that paternalism is her only real choice (Sunstein and 
Thaler, 2003: 1164). Malevolence is fortunately uncommon but it nonetheless exists (Kolm, 1995). 
Random choice set apart14 there are moreover many other possible criteria to arrange dishes: one can 
order them by size, by color, by shape, by composition, by season, by name, by origin etc. Altruism is 
then just one of many options available to the director of the cafeteria. Why would she prefer this 
particular option to all the others? 
Behavioral economists have repeatedly shown that self-interested individuals often prove unable to act 
rationally. In a similar way morally motivated individuals can also be incapable of acting 
correspondingly. Behavioral biases divert decision-makers away from their ‘ideal’ choice in morals as 
well as in prudence. Numerous experimental studies support this statement, a number of which have 
been presented by John Doris in a compelling book on individuals’ (absence of) character (Doris, 
2002)15. In other words, individuals do not act altruistically because they are morally good persons, 
                                                     
14
 Can a choice be absolutely random? Statisticians and neuroscientists have observed that the human brain is ill-
disposed toward randomness and that individuals frequently prefer adopting any given criterion of choice rather 
than (unsuccessfully) attempting to simulate a random statistical distribution. MLODINOW, L. (2008), The 
Drunkard's Walk: How Randomness Rules Our Lives. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. 
15 Amongst the vast array of experiments quoted by Doris, let me mention two cases to illustrate the importance 
of framing effects in moral choice. The first one, undertaken in 1972 by the American psychologists Alice Isen 
and Paula Levin, took place in a shopping mall near a phone box (Isen and Levin, 1972). Passersby and 
customers using the phone box were the unwitting participants of the experiment. At the end of each call, a 
young woman ‘accidentally’ dropped a folder, thus spreading all her papers across the floor. The aim of the 
experiment was to study whether individuals are more likely to behave altruistically when they are in a good 
mood. Phone callers are divided in two groups, a control group for which nothing is done and a test group 
composed of good-humored subjects. In order to put the subjects in a good mood the experimenters place a 
‘forgotten’ dime in the phone receiver for the callers to find. The results of the study were striking: 14 out of 16 
callers who found the dime came to the aid of the ‘clumsy’ young woman, whilst only one out the 25 who did 
not find the dime did! The second study belongs to a series of experiments led by the social psychologist Robert 
A. Baron (Baron and Thomley, 1994, Baron and Bronfen, 1994, Baron, 1997) highlighting the effect of aromas 
on human behavior. In the last experiment Baron shows that individuals located near to a pleasant source of 
aromas (such as hot croissants or coffee) were more disposed to help passersby (in need of change in his 
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but because favorable circumstances prompt them to act in such a way at this particular moment. The 
same person in the same situation but under different circumstances might act differently. A simple 
example could clear things out. When I go to town, I always park my car in the same parking. There is 
invariably a beggar (usually the same) waiting for some change at the till. Sometimes I give him 
money, sometimes I don’t. Situations and persons are exactly the same. The only thing that varies– 
and that ultimately motivate my action – is the state of my mood. When I am in a good mood I give 
away, when in a bad mood I don’t. Being a sunny day can make the difference. We all have similar 
experiences in our lives. I believe the same thing applies to the director of the cafeteria. Having the 
opportunity to act altruistically or paternalistically is not a reason per se to do so. And this, I shall 
argue, is fortunate as it not only demonstrates that paternalism can be genuinely morally motivated (3rd 
criticism) but it also reinforces BP’s position in terms of respect of personal autonomy (1st criticism) 
and individual equality (2nd criticism). 
Paternalist agents are not more rational or more insightful than the people they propose to help. But 
what if they were morally ‘superior’? What if they owed their status to their moral rather than to their 
cognitive excellence? This would, I contend, have dramatic consequences. Paternalism has been 
widely (and partly correctly) criticized for letting the self-proclaimed ‘uppermost intelligent’ or 
‘supremely rational’ individuals interfere with those they considered ‘too stupid to run their lives’. If 
paternalism were to be the prerogative of the ‘morally superior’, then they would undoubtedly 
interfere with the lives of those they deem as ‘too corrupt to live a morally worthy life’. What then 
differentiates moral paternalism, as Gerald Dworkin calls it, from normal or legal paternalism “is the 
idea that a person’s welfare can directly involve, and therefore be increased by, changes in their moral 
character and actions – changes which do not necessarily result in their being happier or healthier, 
etc.” (Dworkin, 2005: 308). These changes are coercive (and thus illegitimate) if they are not later 
endorsed by the people concerned (Feinberg, 1986). From an equality point of view they are, however, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
experiment) than those who were situated in a neutral aromatic environment (Baron, 1997). All these 
observations, as well as many others, corroborate recent neurobiological studies that show the impact of 
(positive) emotions on altruism (Damasio, 2004).   
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always illegitimate as they specifically target (and thereby ostracize) a specific category of the 
population.  
The fact that individuals who have the opportunity to act paternalistically do not systematically decide 
to do so has a second advantage: it limits the practice of paternalism and consequently contributes to 
its social acceptability. Most of the philosophical debate on freedom focused on the legitimacy of 
paternalistic actions taken separately. Very little attention has been given, however, to the 
disagreement and the sense of violation felt by individuals who continuously have their self-regarding 
choices interfered with, however legitimate each of these interferences might be. Despite its limits, 
voluntariness might be a good criterion to assess the legitimacy of an interference (Olsaretti, 2004) but 
it does not take into account the moral cost born by the people who are interfered with. Imagine Maria 
decides to dine out with some friends to celebrate her 40th birthday. Maria is seriously overweight. She 
tries to lose weight but has little willpower. At the restaurant she orders a pizza and some Italian wine. 
They all have an enjoyable evening and then the waiter comes to take the dessert orders. Maria is 
about to choose a dessert, when a man at the neighboring table suddenly stands up and urges her ‘for 
her own sake’ not to have dessert. Pizza, he says, was already highly inappropriate for her, considering 
her weight; dessert would be ‘suicidal’. Technically speaking his intervention is legitimate since her 
eating fat is not ‘fully voluntary’. His action is, however, socially inconsiderate and morally harmful. 
Even if Maria has willpower issues she should have the right not to have all her alimentary choices 
being questioned and she should certainly not be subjected to such public humiliation. All paternalistic 
opportunities should not be exercised, however legitimate or well-intentioned they seem to be. If 
everyone were to act altruistically our life would soon become absolutely unbearable.  
 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this article I have endeavored to show that the new type of paternalism defended by Sunstein and 
Thaler (amongst others) is better prepared to respond to moral attacks than any other type of 
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paternalism so far. Although its libertarian feature is not fully asserted, behavioral paternalism – 
correctly stated – does not fall under Anderson’s equalitarian critic. Unlike its more traditional 
expressions it can also prove to be truly altruistic. Its disinterestedness and absence of condescendence 
make BP the only acceptable form of paternalism in modern society. BP is not morally irreproachable 
yet. To some extent it still does infringe on individual freedom and it certainly cannot be described as 
‘libertarian’. I have not, however, been interested here by its ideological potentialities but by its moral 
implications. Paternalism, as I said, is a form of altruism. Yet, one is intuitively regarded as ‘good’ 
when the other is always regarded as ‘wrong’. What exactly makes paternalism wrong? At what 
conditions could it be ‘good’? Those are the questions I tried to answer to here. But to complete this 
investigation one would also need to question the nature of altruism: ‘What exactly makes altruism 
‘good’?’ and ‘At what conditions could it be ‘wrong’?’ My very last point suggests indeed that what 
people believe to be wrong in paternalism could well also be something that is wrong with altruism.  
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